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I. INTRODUCTION

A review of the past two years’ cases involving confessions, searches, and
seizures reveals important developments made by the United States Supreme
Court. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also decided a number of cases in
these areas, which largely served to clarify existing law. This article reviews the
most significant cases decided during the two-year survey period regarding (1)
confessions and (2) searches and seizures. Each part identifies the areas of
confession and search-and-seizure law that the recently decided cases implicate,
discusses the courts’ opinions in those cases, and analyzes the cases’ significance
to the law of Texas and the United States.
II. CONFESSIONS
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 2 Procedural
safeguards under both the federal and the Texas Constitution protect this right.
Perhaps chief among them, originating in Miranda v. Arizona,3 is the
requirement that authorities inform suspects of their right to remain silent and
their right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation. 4 Other facets of the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination prohibit the State from
commenting on a defendant’s refusal to testify at trial, 5 insulate probationers
from compelled self-incrimination, 6 and govern the circumstances under which
a suspect may claim Fifth Amendment protections prior to trial.7
A. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
As noted above, the Constitution forbids compelling a suspect to incriminate
himself. 8 To safeguard this right, the Supreme Court has articulated that before
a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be informed of
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)(incorporating the
privilege against self-incrimination).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Id. at 467–70.
5. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
6. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984); Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1, 5–
6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
7. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427; see also United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigration,
273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927).
8. See supra notes 1–2.

2014]

Criminal Procedure

103

his right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him
in a court of law, of the right to an attorney and to have an attorney present
during interrogation, and of the right to have an attorney appointed if he is
unable to personally afford one. 9 Texas has codified these warnings as Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22. 10 If law enforcement fails to properly
admonish a suspect regarding these rights, any confession obtained in a
contemporaneous interrogation is inadmissible in court. 11
1. Bobby v. Dixon
In Bobby v. Dixon, 12 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals erred in granting Dixon habeas corpus relief under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) because the Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision to allow the admission of Dixon’s confession was not clear error as
required for relief under the Act. 13
Archie Dixon and Tim Hoffner murdered Chris Hammer and stole his car. 14
Dixon then used Hammer’s identification to sell the car and forged Hammer’s
name on the check he received in payment. 15 Investigating officers suspected
Dixon’s involvement and questioned him in a non-custodial setting about the
murder, but Dixon refused to answer any questions without the presence of his
lawyer. 16 Next, police were able to determine that Dixon had sold Hammer’s car
and arrested him for forgery. 17 Officers chose not to provide Dixon with
Miranda warnings at that time, fearing that he would refuse to speak to them
about Hammer’s murder. 18 During this unwarned interrogation, Dixon
confessed to forgery. 19 Police also attempted to elicit a murder confession by
telling Dixon that his accomplice, Tim Hoffner, was about to reveal the
involvement of both men in the killing, but Dixon avowed that he had
“[n]othing whatsoever” to do with Hammer’s death. 20
After this interview concluded, Hoffner led police to where Hammer’s body
was buried.21 Later that day, the police initiated a second interview with
Dixon. 22 Before any questioning began, Dixon told officers that he had spoken
to his lawyer and now wished to confess to murdering Hammer. 23 Dixon was
read his Miranda rights, and he signed a waiver of those rights before providing
police with a detailed confession. 24
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–73.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a) (West 2013).
Id. §§ 2–3.
Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26 (2011) (per curiam).
Id. at 27; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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At trial, Dixon argued that his murder confession should be suppressed.25
Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court found that Dixon’s confession was
admissible because, under Oregon v. Elstad,26 a suspect who initially responded to
unwarned but uncoercive questioning can waive his rights and confess at a
subsequent interrogation after he has been given the proper Miranda warnings. 27
Dixon then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision “contravened clearly established federal law.” 28 A
divided panel of the Sixth Circuit agreed with Dixon and granted him the
requested relief. 29
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, stated that a
federal court only has authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus under AEDPA
when a state court decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.” 30 The Court addressed each of
the “errors” in the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision that the Sixth Circuit
identified as egregious and concluded that none of them rose to that exacting
standard.31 First, the Sixth Circuit had indicated that admitting Dixon’s murder
confession was egregious error because Dixon had previously refused to answer
the police’s questions before he had been arrested on the forgery charge. 32 The
Supreme Court indicated that this could not possibly be error because an
individual cannot invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily in a context other
than custodial interrogation. 33 Second, the Sixth Circuit held that police
violated Dixon’s rights by urging him to “cut a deal” before his accomplice Tim
Hoffner revealed their involvement in Hammer’s murder. 34 The Supreme Court
held that this could not be error, either, because “the Court [had previously]
refused to find that a defendant who confesses, after being falsely told that his
codefendant” had provided the State with evidence, had made an involuntary
confession. 35
Third, the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio Supreme Court had unreasonably
applied Oregon v. Elstad to this case.36 In Elstad, a suspect who had not received
Miranda warnings confessed to a burglary. 37 About an hour later, the suspect
received his Miranda warnings and made a second confession regarding the same
offense. 38 The Supreme Court held that the later, warned confession was
admissible because it had been voluntarily made. 39 In this case, however, the
25. Id. at 28–29.
26. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
27. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 29.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).
31. Id. at 29–32.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556
U.S. 778, 795 (2009)).
34. Id. at 29–30.
35. Id. (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985)).
36. Id. at 30.
37. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301.
38. Id. at 301–02.
39. Id. at 318.
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Sixth Circuit held that Dixon’s confession was not voluntary because it was the
product of a “question-first, warn-later strategy” like that addressed by the
Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert. 40 In Seibert, police used a two-step strategy
to reduce the effect of Miranda warnings: a suspect was questioned until she
confessed, and then, after a short break, Miranda warnings were provided and
the suspect was asked to repeat the prior confession. 41 The Court held that this
tactic could not produce an admissible confession because a suspect could not
think he had a genuine right to remain silent based on the answers he had
already given to the prior questioning. 42
The Sixth Circuit believed that the voluntariness of Dixon’s confession in this
case was obliterated by his prior, unwarned confession to the forgery offense. 43
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. 44 First, it reasoned, there was no
indication that either of Dixon’s confessions were given involuntarily. 45 And
second, Dixon’s confession to murder was not at all like the involuntary
confession in Seibert where police asked the suspect to repeat her prior
confession after providing Miranda warnings. 46 In this case, Dixon denied
involvement in Hammer’s murder in his first confession. 47 As a result, police
could neither have had Dixon repeat an earlier murder confession, nor could
they have used the first confession to coerce the later one. 48
Dixon serves to reaffirm the Supreme Court’s commitment to the principles of
Miranda and Elstad. 49 Police must notify suspects of their Fifth Amendment
rights before commencing a custodial interrogation. 50 However, an unwarned
confession does not automatically destroy the possibility that a subsequent,
properly-warned confession will be admissible in court. 51 So long as the
subsequent confession is voluntary and not the product of a coercive “questionfirst, warn-later” strategy, it will satisfy the safeguards of the Fifth Amendment. 52
2. Howes v. Fields
Miranda v. Arizona was designed to protect suspects from the “inherently
compelling pressures of custodial interrogation.” 53 This underlying purpose of
the Miranda safeguards has frequently led the Supreme Court to address the
circumstances in which a suspect is considered to be in “custody” and therefore
deserving of a recitation of his rights. 54 In Howes v. Fields, the Court examined
40. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 30–31; Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
41. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604–06.
42. Id. at 613.
43. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 30–31.
44. Id. at 32.
45. Id. at 30.
46. Id. at 31.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 30–31.
49. See id. at 30–32.
50. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–70 (1966).
51. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985).
52. See id.; Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613 (2004).
53. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
54. Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012).
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whether an inmate, incarcerated for a separate offense, is considered in
“custody” when he is questioned by law enforcement about his involvement in
another criminal transaction. 55
Randall Fields was serving a sentence in a Michigan jail when law
enforcement officers removed him from the general prison population and
brought him to a conference room where officers questioned him about sexual
involvement with a minor he was alleged to have committed prior to his
incarceration. 56 Fields was never given Miranda warnings, but he was not
handcuffed during the interview, and he was told several times that he was free
to leave at any point. 57 Fields later testified that he informed the officers several
times during the interview that he no longer wished to speak with them, but he
at no point specifically asked to be returned to his cell. 58 He eventually
confessed to the officers that he did have sexual relations with the minor. 59
At trial, Fields argued that his confession should be suppressed. 60 The trial
judge ruled that he had not been in custody for purposes of Miranda during the
interview, and thus no Miranda warnings were required. 61 On appeal, the
Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 62 Fields next filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which granted
relief. 63 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that clearly
established federal law required Miranda warnings to be given when an inmate is
removed from the general prison population and questioned about conduct
occurring outside the prison environment. 64
The Supreme Court disagreed. First, the Court explained that under the
AEDPA, no “clearly established federal law” required Miranda warnings in a
prison setting; indeed, the Court had recently declined to adopt such a brightline rule. 65 As a result, habeas relief was not warranted. 66 Second, the Court
indicated that Fields’s interrogation was not custodial. 67 Simply because a
suspect’s freedom of movement is restricted does not automatically mean that
the suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes.68 The real inquiry is “whether
the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the
type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” 69 The Court outlined
55. Id. at 1186–87.
56. Id. at 1185.
57. Id. at 1186.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1186–87; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (stating that habeas relief may be
granted if a state-court adjudication is the result of a “decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.”).
65. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1187–88 (citing Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)).
66. Id. at 1187–89.
67. Id. at 1194.
68. Id. at 1189.
69. Id. at 1190 (citing Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112).
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three reasons why imprisonment alone is not considered “custody” for Miranda
purposes:
(1) questioning a person who is already in prison does not involve the
shock that accompanies arrest;
(2) an inmate is unlikely to be lured into a confession because of his
desire for a prompt release; and
(3) an inmate knows that law enforcement officers “lack the authority to
affect the duration of his sentence.” 70
Based on these factors and the undisputed fact that Fields was told that he
was free to end the questioning and return to his cell at any time, the Court
concluded that Fields was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda. 71
The Court’s holding in Howes lessens the responsibility of officers to provide
already-incarcerated suspects a recitation of their Fifth Amendment rights. 72 So
long as an inmate is assured that he is free to end the interview and return to his
cell at any time, it seems that officers need not provide Miranda warnings. 73 The
Court’s decision, however, leaves ambiguous the question of when exactly
Miranda warnings would be required within a prison setting. 74 Justice Ginsberg,
in a dissenting opinion, pointed out that Fields told officers more than once
that he did not want to speak with them anymore, yet officers never terminated
the interview or returned Fields to his cell. 75 The majority in Howes never
addressed how Fields’s statements affected their conclusion that the
interrogation was non-custodial, and thus it is possible that such an interview
would only be deemed “custodial” if the inmate specifically requested to be
returned to his cell and officers instead refused and continued interrogating
him. 76
3. Elizondo v. State
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed under what circumstances
non-law enforcement officers are required to give Miranda warnings in Elizondo
v. State.77 In this case, Becky Elizondo was caught shoplifting clothing from an
Old Navy store and was asked to read and sign a “civil demand notice” by the
store’s loss-prevention officer. 78 Elizondo signed the notice which was an
admission that she had stolen merchandise.79 She later argued that the notice
should be suppressed based on the theory that the officer should have given her
Miranda warnings because he was engaged in an agency relationship with law
enforcement. 80

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1190–91.
Id. at 1194.
See id.
See id. at 1193.
See id. at 1193–94.
Id. at 1195 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
See id.
Elizondo v. State, 382 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Previously, the Court had determined that Miranda warnings were required
when the interviewer was acting as an instrumentality of the State and fashioned
three factors that courts should consider in making that determination.81 In this
case, the Court acknowledged that “private citizens, even security guards, are not
ordinarily considered ‘law enforcement officers,’” and stated that Elizondo had
the burden to prove that the loss-prevention officer was acting as an agent of law
enforcement when he interviewed her. 82 Ultimately, the Court concluded that
the loss-prevention officer was not an agent of law enforcement. 83 There was no
indication that police relied upon the officer’s notice as evidence or even asked
to use it as such. 84 The officer’s reason for obtaining the notice was to adhere to
the policies of his employer, rather than for purposes of prosecution. 85 And
nothing in the record indicated that Elizondo believed that the officer was
acting as an agent of law enforcement at the time of the interview. 86 Because no
factor indicated an agency relationship, the loss-prevention officer was not
deemed to be an agent of law-enforcement officials. 87
Elizondo served to reinforce the principles the Court had already set forth in
determining whether a private citizen acts as an agent of law enforcement for
Miranda-warning purposes. 88 Defendants will have to be careful to establish
some link between the private party and police or prosecution if they wish to
establish such a relationship. 89 When the State does not use the confession
obtained by the private party as evidence, it will be difficult for a defendant to
prove that the agency relationship existed at the time of the interview. 90
4. Alford v. State
The Court of Criminal Appeals considered an exception to Miranda in Alford
v. State. 91 In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, a four-justice plurality of the United States
Supreme Court recognized that Miranda warnings need not be given prior to
custodial interrogation when police were merely asking questions necessary to
secure biographical data used to complete booking or pretrial services. 92 The
Supreme Court reasoned that such questions are asked for “record-keeping
purposes only” and do not implicate the Fifth Amendment concerns at issue in
Miranda. 93 The Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently adopted this
exception, 94 and the details of its application were brought before the Court in
81. Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 530–31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (stating that the
factors are (1) “the relationship between the police and the potential police agent;” (2) “the
interviewer’s actions and perceptions;” and (3) “the defendant’s perceptions of the encounter”).
82. Elizondo, 382 S.W.3d at 394–95.
83. Id. at 396.
84. Id. at 395.
85. .Id.
86. Id. at 396.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 390–91.
89. See id. at 395.
90. See id. at 396.
91. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 649–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
92. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600–02 (1990) (plurality opinion).
93. Id. at 601–02.
94. See Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 521, 524 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
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Alford.95
Alford was arrested for resisting arrest and was taken to jail. 96 After transport,
police searched the back seat of the patrol car pursuant to department procedure
and discovered a computer flash drive hidden under the seat. 97 While Alford
was being booked by jail facility personnel, he was asked what the flash drive was
and whether it belonged to him. 98 Alford responded that the item was a
“memory drive” and that it did belong to him. 99 At this point, Alford had not
been provided with Miranda warnings.100 The flash drive was placed with
Alford’s personal property for safekeeping. 101 Alford later filed a pretrial motion
to suppress the statements he made to the booking officer. 102
The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that Alford was in custody when
he answered these questions, but concluded that his statements were admissible
because they fell under the Muniz “booking-question exception” to Miranda.103
Because courts across the nation hold divergent views as to the scope of this
exception, the Court elaborated that, “in deciding the admissibility of a
statement under th[is] exception, a trial court must determine whether the
question reasonably relates to a legitimate administrative concern, applying an
objective standard.” 104 This analysis is not affected by whether the questioning
officer knows or should know that the answers provided will be incriminating. 105
In this case, because the flash drive was immediately placed with Alford’s
personal property for safekeeping, the totality of the circumstances objectively
showed that the officer’s questions were reasonably related to a legitimate
administrative concern and thus fell within the exception. 106 The holding in
Alford gives officers significant leeway in asking unwarned questions pursuant to
administrative procedures such as booking. 107 However, the Court has yet to
address other significant issues relating to the “booking-question exception,”
such as whether safety concerns in a jail setting allow officers to question new
inmates about gang affiliation. 108
B. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Fifth Amendment’s general protection against being compelled in any
95. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 647.
96. Id. at 650.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 650–51.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 651.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 662.
104. Id. at 659–60.
105. Id. (reasoning that to hold otherwise would render the exception a nullity, as any kind of
police questioning would be subject to a “should-have-known” test).
106. Id. at 662.
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, No. AP-75167, 2007 WL 4375936, at *15 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec.
12, 2007) (not designated for publication) (holding that questions regarding gang affiliation during
the booking process were admissible under the booking-question exception); Pierce v. State, 234
S.W.3d 265, 272 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. ref’d) (reaching the same holding as Ramirez).
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criminal case to be a witness against oneself—termed the privilege against selfincrimination—prohibits forced testimony that falls properly within its scope.109
For example, the State may not comment on a defendant’s refusal to testify at
trial, 110 or revoke probation solely because of the legitimate exercise of a Fifth
Amendment privilege.111 However, a defendant’s silence prior to custodial arrest
does not receive such stringent protections. 112 Specifically, the Supreme Court
has held that a suspect who wishes to enjoy Fifth Amendment protection of his
refusal to respond to police questioning before he has received his Miranda
warnings must affirmatively claim that protection. 113
1. Salinas v. Texas
In Salinas v. Texas, the Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court addressed the requirement that a suspect must affirmatively
assert his rights prior to receiving his Miranda warnings in order to enjoy Fifth
Amendment protections. 114 In Salinas, two brothers were shot and killed in their
home and police found six shotgun shell casings at the scene. 115 The
investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas, who agreed to hand over his
shotgun for ballistics testing and voluntarily accompanied officers to the police
station for questioning. 116 At the station, Salinas answered questions freely until
he was asked whether his shotgun would match the shells recovered at the
scene. 117 At that point, Salinas said nothing but exhibited distinct signs of
nervousness. 118 After a few moments of silence, police began asking different
questions, which Salinas answered.119
At trial, prosecutors used Salinas’s reaction to the officers’ question as
evidence of his guilt. 120 He was found guilty, and on appeal, argued that this use
of his silence violated the Fifth Amendment. 121 The Court of Criminal Appeals
rejected Salinas’s claim. 122 The court held that while the Fifth Amendment
protected defendants against compelled self-incrimination, Salinas’s pre-arrest,
pre-Miranda interactions with police were not compelled. 123 Thus, the Fifth
Amendment’s safeguards could not apply to a suspect’s decision to remain silent

109. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984).
110. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
111. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438.
112. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation when
defendant who choose to testify was cross-examined regarding his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence);
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240–41 (1980) (no violation for cross-examination regarding
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence).
113. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 425 (citing United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943)).
114. Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct.
2174, 2179 (2013) (plurality opinion).
115. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2177–78.
121. Id. at 2178.
122. Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
123. Id.
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when he is under no official compulsion to speak. 124
The Supreme Court granted Salinas’s petition for certiorari.125 Ultimately,
the Court agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that a suspect must assert
his privilege against self-incrimination in order to benefit from it in the context
of a pre-arrest, pre-Miranda questioning. 126 The Court stated that the
requirement that a suspect affirmatively assert the privilege has two exceptions:
(1) that a criminal defendant need not take the stand to assert the
privilege at trial; and
(2) that a witness’s failure to invoke the privilege is excused where
governmental coercion rendered that failure involuntary. 127
In this case, it could not be said that Salinas’s failure to invoke his privilege
was due to governmental coercion because it was undisputed that his interview
with police was voluntary. 128
The Court also declined to create a new exception for cases in which a
suspect stands mute and thereby declines to give an answer police suspect would
be incriminating. 129 It indicated that such a rule would go against its precedent,
which indicated that a defendant normally cannot invoke the privilege by
remaining silent and would also unduly burden the government’s ability to
prosecute criminal activity. 130 The Court reinforced the fact that the
requirement to affirmatively assert the privilege is not difficult to apply and
avoids needless inquiries into what kind of conduct constitutes “silence” for
Fifth Amendment purposes. 131
The Salinas case provides prosecutors with a powerful tool: they may freely
comment on a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence if such a refusal to
answer a question was in the context of a voluntary, non-coercive interview with
police. 132 But as the dissent notes, this decision does not specifically state what is
required of a suspect in order for him to assert his right against selfincrimination. 133 Must he mention the Fifth Amendment or his right to silence
by name, or would simply asking to change the subject or end the interview
suffice? 134 This question is likely one that will come before courts in the near
future.
2. Dansby v. State
In Dansby v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the

124. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
125. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2179–80.
128. Id. at 2180.
129. Id. at 2180–81.
130. Id. at 2181 (citing Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560 (1980); United States v.
Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263–64 (1927); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigration,
273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927)).
131. Id. at 2183–84.
132. See id. at 2179–80.
133. Id. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
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privilege against self-incrimination in the context of conditions of probation. 135
Michael Dansby was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for
the offense of indecency with a child. 136 As part of his conditions of probation,
he was ordered to attend a sex offender treatment program and submit to
polygraph examinations.137 Eventually, he was required to submit to a sexual
history polygraph, and when he refused to answer questions about extraneous
prior sexual offenses, Dansby was discharged from the program. 138 The State
filed a motion to adjudicate alleging that Dansby had failed to obtain the sexual
history polygraph and failed to attend and successfully complete the treatment
program. 139 The trial judge granted the State’s motion over Dansby’s objection
that the motion to adjudicate amounted to an unconstitutional penalty on his
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.140
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that Dansby’s probation had been
revoked on the basis of his refusal to answer incriminating questions during the
polygraph test and during sex offender group therapy sessions. 141 The court of
appeals had attempted to avoid the constitutional issue by holding that Dansby’s
revocation could have been based solely on his failure to successfully complete
the treatment program. 142 The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, indicated
that such an issue may be avoided only “if the violation upon which the
reviewing court relies to uphold the trial court’s ruling is itself unquestionably
free of constitutional taint”—and in this case, there was a very strong inference
that Dansby’s unwillingness to incriminate himself was the deciding factor that
led to his discharge. 143 The Court stated that the record “strongly suggest[ed]”
that if Dansby had agreed to return to treatment and take the sexual history
polygraph, the motion to revoke would have been dismissed, and Dansby’s
supervisors had certainly never testified that Dansby would have been discharged
regardless of whether or not he had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. 144
The new “constitutional infection theory” that the Court fashioned in Dansby
serves as an exception to the rule that an appellate court is entitled to rely on a
single violation in affirming a revocation of community supervision. 145 However,
as the dissent points out, the Court’s inquiry into the reasons behind Dansby’s
discharge from the treatment program—essentially an analysis of the subjective
intent of Dansby’s supervisors—may ultimately dilute the abuse-of-discretion
standard that has long been the standard of review for a trial judge’s revocation

135. Dansby v. State, 398 S.W.3d 233, 239–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
136. Id. at 234.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 234–35.
139. Id. at 235.
140. Id. at 239–40.
141. Id. at 240.
142. Dansby v. State, No. 05-10-00866-CR, 2012 WL 1150530, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 9,
2012, pet. granted) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
143. Dansby, 398 S.W.3d at 241.
144. Id. at 242.
145. Id. at 242–43; see also Downey v. State, No. 02-12-00511-CR, 2013 WL 5303634, at *3
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(illustrating how this “exception” has been utilized by at least one Texas court of appeals).
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of probation. 146 It may be possible to reconcile Dansby with prior cases by
reasoning that the Court essentially held that the trial judge abused his
discretion when he revoked Dansby’s probation when the evidence strongly
suggested that the motion had been filed in response to Dansby’s assertion of
his Fifth Amendment rights.147 But this is not clear from the Court’s bottom
line. 148 In any case, to successfully sidestep a probationer’s constitutional claim
of error, prosecutors will now have to be able to prove that at least one ground
of a motion to revoke probation is wholly untainted by the constitutional
issue.149
III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” 150 At its
most basic level, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals against
unreasonable governmental intrusions.151 To qualify for these constitutional
protections, an individual must have standing to challenge an unreasonable
search or seizure: first, they must prove that the actor conducting the intrusion
was a governmental agent; 152 and second, they must prove that they had both “a
subjective expectation of privacy” in the person, place, or thing being searched
and that society would be prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable. 153
A. PROPERTY-BASED FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has undergone something of a sea change
in the last two years. Since 1967, when the United States Supreme Court
decided Katz v. United States, a determination of whether a government search
violated the Fourth Amendment revolved around whether an individual enjoyed

146. Dansby, 398 S.W.3d at 244 (Keasler, J., dissenting); see also Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d
759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that appellate review of an order revoking probation is
limited to an abuse-of-discretion standard).
147. See Dansby, 398 S.W.3d at 242–43 (majority opinion) (“In the absence of testimony that
[Dansby’s supervisors] would have discharged the appellant . . . quite apart from his failure to
incriminate himself, the State has not established that his discharge presented a sufficient basis to
proceed to adjudication that was wholly independent of his claim of Fifth Amendment privilege.”).
148. See id.
149. Id. at 241.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
151. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“[The Fourth] Amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409, 1414 (2013) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against “physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983))).
152. Bessey v. State, 199 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006), aff’d, 239 S.W.3d 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487–88 (1971)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is predicated upon unconstitutional police
conduct, not the conduct of private citizens).
153. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 258 (5th Cir. 2007); Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103,
108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the space searched. 154 This analysis was
predicated upon the principle that “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places.” 155 But before that decision, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
tied to common-law trespass and was based on whether the space searched was
constitutionally protected because of an individual’s property interest therein. 156
Recently, in United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court
announced that the Katz privacy-based model had not supplanted the earlier
property-based model, and that the two models coexist as alternate means of
determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. 157
In Jones, the FBI began investigating Antoine Jones in order to determine
whether he was trafficking in narcotics. 158 Agents obtained a warrant to apply an
electronic tracking device to Jones’s vehicle within ten days and only in the
District of Columbia. 159 On the eleventh day, and not in the District of
Columbia but in Maryland, agents installed the device on Jones’s vehicle and
began to track his movements. 160 In part because of the evidence obtained
therefrom, Jones was indicted for multiple drug trafficking offenses. 161 Jones
challenged the evidence gleaned from the tracking device, claiming it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.162
The Supreme Court held that, on a very basic level, the Fourth Amendment
protected “persons, houses, papers, and effects” from unreasonable searches,
and that a vehicle was unquestionably an “effect” as stated in the
Amendment.163 As such, the government’s installation of a tracking device on
Jones’s vehicle and the subsequent use of that device to track the vehicle’s
movements was a Fourth Amendment search. 164 The government, employing
the Katz privacy-based model, argued that the search, although not executed
pursuant to a valid warrant, was valid because Jones had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the exterior of his vehicle accessed by agents, as those
parts were clearly visible to the public. 165 However, the Supreme Court indicated
that simply because a search was reasonable under the privacy-based model did
not mean that it was also reasonable under the property-based model: “[W]e [do
not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons
and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection

154. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979).
155. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
156. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012) (citing Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004)).
157. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950) (“The Katz
reasonable-expectations test ‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based
understanding of the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis in original)).
158. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 48.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 949 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 950.
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which the Amendment extends.” 166 As such, the government’s warrantless
intrusion upon Jones’s constitutionally protected property violated the Fourth
Amendment. 167
Florida v. Jardines afforded the Court another opportunity to reinforce the
mutual coexistence of the privacy-based and property-based models.168 In
Jardines, police received an unverified tip that Jardines was growing marijuana
inside his home. 169 Officers brought a drug-sniffing dog to Jardines’s front
porch, and the dog signaled to his handler that he detected the smell of drugs
emanating from the house. 170 On the basis of the dog’s performance, officers
obtained and executed a search warrant for the home. 171 Marijuana was found
inside, and Jardines was charged with a drug trafficking offense. 172 At trial,
Jardines moved to suppress the drug evidence on the basis that the canine
investigation was an unreasonable search. 173
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles it laid out
in Jones: that the Fourth Amendment protects against the government’s physical
intrusion into constitutionally protected areas; 174 that the home is the area
where an individual’s privacy expectations are the most heightened; 175 and that a
decision in this case could be made on the basis of the property model alone,
because that model coexists with the Katz privacy-based model. 176 The Court
also reasoned that property-based protections would be of little value if
government agents could intrude upon the areas in close proximity to the house
with impunity, and therefore not only the house but its “curtilage” is
constitutionally protected by the Fourth Amendment.177 And because Jardines’s
front porch was part of the “curtilage” associated with his home, the officers’
investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area. 178
Despite that fact, however, the canine investigation would only violate the
Fourth Amendment if it constituted an unlicensed physical intrusion into the
curtilage. 179 After all, an officer “need not ‘shield [his] eyes’ when passing by the
home ‘on public thoroughfares.’” 180 The facts of Jardines stand in stark contrast
to an officer casually observing a home in passing, however—it cannot be said
that it is customary for an officer to perform a canine sniff on an individual’s
front porch. 181 As a result, the investigation was unlicensed and constituted an
166. Id. at 950–51 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969)).
167. Id. at 954.
168. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–17 (2013).
169. Id. at 1413.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1414.
175. Id. at 1414–15 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
176. Id. at 1417.
177. Id. at 1414 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (defining “curtilage”
as “the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home”)).
178. Id. at 1415.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213).
181. Id. at 1416.
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unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 182
The ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones and Jardines are
far-reaching. Now, when courts and litigants analyze Fourth Amendment claims,
they must determine whether an unreasonable search has occurred under both
the privacy- and property-based models. 183 An analysis under the property-based
model is complicated by the fact that it is not always clear what property is
protected by the Fourth Amendment. For example, lower courts—including
Texas courts of appeals—have already begun to grapple with what exactly
constitutes the “curtilage” of a home. 184 Likewise, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals took these developments into account when it remanded Rivas v. State,
a case factually similar to Jardines, to the court of appeals for that court to
consider the effect that Jardines had upon its outcome.185
B. GENERAL SCOPE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The general requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as indicated above,
require that law enforcement officials obtain a warrant, predicated upon
probable cause, before they are permitted to conduct a search or seize persons or
property. 186 However, the Supreme Court’s decisions indicate that applying this
framework rigidly in every situation is unworkable. 187 For example, under the
Katz privacy-based model, police may freely search spaces in which an individual
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 188 Additionally, officers have
categorical authority to detain individuals incident to a lawful search, regardless
of probable cause. 189 Recently, the Supreme Court has elaborated upon a
number of situations that are expansions upon the traditional framework.
1. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington
The question of which constitutional rights are enjoyed by the inmates of jails
and prisons is one that has been frequently tackled by the Supreme Court. For
example, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court held that the usual reasonable-expectationof-privacy framework used to determine standing to challenge a search under the
Fourth Amendment was impossible to apply in the prison context, 190 as “there is
no mechanical way to determine whether intrusions on an inmate’s privacy are
reasonable. . . . [Instead,] [t]he need for a particular search must be balanced
against the resulting invasion of personal rights.” 191 In that case, the Court
182. Id. at 1417–18.
183. See id. at 1417; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Bausby, 720 F.3d 652, 656–57 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that a
motorcycle on display in an individual’s front yard is not within the “curtilage” of the house);
Sayers v. State, No. 01-12-00712-CR, 2013 WL 6181852, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov.
26, 2013, no pet. h.) (holding that a flowerbed adjacent to a house is within the house’s
“curtilage”).
185. Rivas v. State, 411 S.W.3d 920, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
186. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697–98 (1981).
190. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
191. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (2012) (citing Bell, 441 U.S.
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upheld a policy of requiring inmates to undergo a strip search after any contact
visit with a person from outside the institution because the policy was based on
considerations of prison safety and security. 192
Recently, the Court extended these principles in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders of Burlington.193 In Florence, officers arrested Albert Florence after
determining that he had an outstanding warrant in the police database and took
him to the county jail. 194 Jail procedures required every arrestee to submit to a
strip search as part of the initial booking process.195 Florence was released the
next day when it was determined that the warrant against him was not valid. 196
Outraged at the invasive search he had been forced to undergo, Florence sued
the jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 197 He argued that persons arrested for a minor
offense should not be required to submit to a strip search. 198 Such an invasive
procedure should be reserved for inmates whom jail personnel suspected of
concealing contraband. 199
In deciding the issue, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles of Bell,
indicating that legitimate safety concerns in prisons require deference to
corrections officials in establishing “reasonable search policies to detect and
deter the possession of contraband.” 200 The Court stated that the practice of
strip searching in this case would be upheld unless there was “substantial
evidence” indicating that prison officials’ preventative measures were
“exaggerated.” 201 It further reasoned that the offense for which an inmate was
arrested, and even the inmate’s criminal history, are poor indicators of whether
the inmate is in possession of contraband. 202 Ultimately, the Court held that the
strip search procedure acceptably balanced inmate privacy and the needs of the
institution and that the search was not a violation of Florence’s constitutional
rights. 203
2. Maryland v. King
In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court addressed whether a cheek or
“buccal” swab of the interior of a recently booked inmate’s mouth for DNA
testing is an unreasonable search of the person. 204 Alonzo King was arrested for
at 558).
192. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 (“[W]e deal here with the question whether visual body-cavity
inspections . . . can ever be conducted on less than probable cause. Balancing the significant and
legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates, we
conclude that they can.”).
193. Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1517–23.
194. Id. at 1514.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1514–15.
198. Id. at 1515.
199. Id. at 1515–16.
200. Id. at 1517.
201. Id. at 1518 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584–85 (1984)).
202. Id. at 1520–22.
203. Id. at 1523.
204. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–66 (2013).
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first- and second-degree assault, and during booking, jail personnel used a cheek
swab to take a DNA sample from him pursuant to Maryland law. 205 DNA testing
revealed that King’s DNA profile matched that of a sample collected in an
unsolved 2003 rape case. 206 After being indicted for rape, King moved to
suppress the cheek swab sample. 207
The Supreme Court, in deciding the question, first recognized that virtually
any intrusion into the human body constitutes an “invasion of cherished
personal security” and is subject to constitutional scrutiny. 208 It stated, however,
that in some circumstances, such as “special law enforcement needs,” Fourth
Amendment protections could be satisfied if the search is reasonable in scope
and in manner of execution. 209 Identifying the cheek swab search as a situation
where “reasonableness” should govern the issue, the Court indicated that strong
governmental interests were served by such searches:
(1) they provide police with a safe and accurate way to identify the
persons they take into custody; 210
(2) they provide law enforcement with untainted information about
inmates useful in maintaining the order and security of jails and
prisons;211 and
(3) they provide information regarding an inmate’s potential future
dangerousness, which is helpful in determining whether an
individual should be released on bail. 212
These compelling interests, the Court concluded, more than make up for
whatever minimal intrusion into an inmate’s personal space a non-invasive
cheek swab imposes. 213 As a result, the Court held that the cheek swab search
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 214
3. Bailey v. United States
The Supreme Court has also held that an individual may be detained without
probable cause while officers are executing a valid search warrant of the premises
in which the individual is located.215 In Michigan v. Summers, the Court indicated
that such a detention is permissible because it constitutes only minimal
intrusion on an individual’s privacy and compelling governmental interests in
play during the execution of a warrant render such a seizure reasonable. 216
Recently, in Bailey v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed whether police
are also permitted to detain individuals some distance away from the premises
205. Id. at 1966.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1969 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770 (1966); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)).
209. Id. at 1969–70.
210. Id. at 1970–71.
211. Id. at 1972.
212. Id. at 1973.
213. Id. at 1977–78.
214. Id. at 1980.
215. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697–98 (1981).
216. Id.
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searched. 217
Police had obtained a warrant to search a house for a handgun. 218 Before the
warrant was executed, officers observed a man, who matched the physical
description of an individual associated with the firearm, leave the house in a
vehicle. 219 After the vehicle left the house, the warrant was executed, and the
house was searched. 220 However, officers also followed the vehicle, eventually
pulled it over, and detained Chunon Bailey “incident to the execution of a
search warrant.” 221 Bailey was indicted for drug possession and possession of a
firearm by a felon. 222 At trial, he moved to suppress evidence derived from what
he claimed was an unreasonable seizure. 223
The Supreme Court decided Bailey on the basis of whether the principles of
Summers also justified detentions beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises
being searched. 224 The Court had identified three principal law enforcement
interests in Summers that justified the detention of occupants of premises during
a search:
(1) officer safety during the search;
(2) freedom from interference from the premises’ occupants; and
(3) the prevention of flight should incriminating evidence be found. 225
The Court concluded that none of these interests are safeguarded when the
individuals detained are physically remote from the premises being searched. 226
Because no “special law enforcement interests” were at stake in this case, Bailey’s
seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 227 The Court’s
decision ensures that police will not be able to justify an individual’s detention
based solely on the execution of a search warrant occurring elsewhere. 228
C. REASONABLE SUSPICION AND PROBABLE CAUSE
The Supreme Court, guided by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
has created standards that govern how and when police may interact with
citizens. “Casual encounters” are consensual interactions between individuals
and police and do not implicate constitutional rights. 229 A temporary,
investigative detention—commonly called a “Terry stop”—is considered a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment and is only justified if the officer has “reasonable
suspicion” that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in
217. Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1035 (2013).
218. Id. at 1036.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1036–37.
224. Id. at 1038 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion)) (“An
exception to the Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting detention absent probable cause must not
diverge from its purpose and rationale.”).
225. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981).
226. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1041.
227. Id. at 1042–43.
228. See id.
229. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983).
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criminal activity. 230 Finally, “probable cause” is required in many instances—for
example:
(1) when an officer makes a warrantless arrest; 231
(2) when an officer conducts the warrantless search of an automobile; 232
or
(3) when an officer wishes to obtain a search or arrest warrant. 233
In the last two years, the Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals have addressed under what circumstances probable cause and
reasonable suspicion are found as well as how warrants should be properly
issued.
1. Florida v. Harris
In Florida v. Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court tackled the question of how a
court should determine whether a canine investigation of an automobile
provides probable cause sufficient to perform a warrantless search. 234 In this
case, an officer pulled over Clayton Harris’s automobile because it had an
expired license plate. 235 Harris was “visibly nervous,” and the officer asked for
consent to search his vehicle. 236 When Harris refused, the officer retrieved a dog
trained to detect narcotics from his patrol car. 237 The dog signaled to the officer
that he detected narcotics in the vehicle, and the officer concluded that he had
probable cause to search the vehicle. 238 Harris was ultimately arrested when the
officer discovered ingredients used to make methamphetamine in the vehicle. 239
Harris moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the dog’s signal had
not given the officer probable cause for a search. 240 On appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the mere fact that the dog had been trained
and certified was insufficient to establish probable cause; instead, the State
needed to present as evidence training and certification records, field
performance records, the experience and training of the officer handling the
dog, and any other objective evidence that bolstered the dog’s reliability. 241
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and ultimately reversed the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision. 242 It reminded lower courts that the test for
probable cause is merely whether the facts available to the investigating officer
230. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005).
231. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
232. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991).
233. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983) (holding that a magistrate is to
determine whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant by examining the “totality of the
circumstances.”).
234. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1053 (2013).
235. Id. at 1053.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1053–54.
238. Id. at 1054.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1055.
242. Id.
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would “warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or
evidence of a crime is present.” 243 Rigid rules, bright-line tests, and finely tuned
standards of proof have no place in the probable-cause inquiry. 244 The Court
stated that Florida’s test for a probable-cause determination in a canine-sniff case
was overly formulaic, as it was “a strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item
the State must tick off” to establish that an officer had probable cause to
search. 245 Instead, evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a training
program would be enough for an officer to trust his alert so long as a defendant
had the opportunity to challenge the dog’s reliability with his own evidence. 246
In this case, because the State had established the dog’s successful training and
proficiency in finding drugs, and because Harris had not rebutted that evidence,
the officer in fact did have probable cause to conduct the warrantless search of
Harris’s automobile based on the dog’s signal that drugs were contained in the
vehicle. 247
2. State v. Duarte
In State v. Duarte, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether a
magistrate could find probable cause sufficient to issue a search warrant for a
residence, based solely on information provided by a first-time informant who
did so based on the expectation of leniency on his pending criminal charges. 248
In deciding the question, the Court reiterated that while the standard for
finding probable cause sufficient for a search warrant was “nondemanding,”
courts should also ensure that warrants are not being issued based on “bare
conclusions alone.” 249 A search warrant affidavit based largely on hearsay from a
confidential informant should be corroborated by independent police work,
because such informants, whose motives for cooperating with officers are often
self-serving, cannot be presumed to be reliable. 250 In this case, the vague,
uncorroborated information provided by the first-time informant did not add
up to probable cause. 251 In the future, police will have to ensure that if a search
warrant affidavit is largely based upon the statements of a first-time informant,
the information relayed by the informant both specifically describes the criminal
activity in question and is corroborated by independent police investigation. 252
3. Arguellez v. State
In Arguellez v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals qualified the ability of
officers to conduct Terry stops based solely on an individual’s so-called
243. Id. (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1056.
246. Id. at 1057.
247. Id. at 1058–59.
248. State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
249. Id. at 354 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
250. Id. at 355–56 (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.3 at 98 (4th ed. 2004)).
251. Id. at 360.
252. See id.
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“suspicious activity” in public. 253 Officers received a call indicating that a man
was parked outside of a public pool, taking pictures of patrons wearing
swimming attire. 254 Feliz Arguellez, the photographer, was detained, asked to
make a statement regarding his activities, and was ultimately indicted for the
offense of improper photography. 255 The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed
the issue by analyzing whether officers had “specific, articulable facts that, when
combined with rational inferences therefrom, le[]d [them] to reasonably
conclude” that Arguellez had “engaged in criminal activity.” 256 The Court
indicated that the totality of the circumstances known to officers “was that an
unknown male in a described vehicle was taking photographs at a public pool,”
and that this by itself was not unusual, suspicious, or criminal. 257 As a result,
Arguellez’s detention was not based on reasonable suspicion and was invalid. 258
The Court’s decision seems to indicate that an officer cannot conduct a Terry
stop when an individual has engaged in activity that is not by itself unusual but
that under some circumstances could be criminal. 259 To conduct the stop, he
must instead have additional articulable facts that point firmly at the presence of
criminal activity. 260 But as the dissent points out, a reasonable suspicion
determination typically does not require that the articulable facts relied upon by
police be criminal acts in and of themselves.261 Thus, the Arguellez decision
seems to have heightened the reasonable suspicion standard, although it is
possible that the Court’s decision affects such a determination only in the
context of facts similar to those in this case. 262
D. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court has frequently reiterated the principle that “searches
conducted outside the judicial process”—in other words, warrantless searches—
“are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 263 However, the Court
has also carved out situations where warrantless searches are deemed reasonable,
but has always been careful to indicate that these exceptions are “specifically
established and well-delineated” so as to provide proper guidance to law
enforcement. 264 Exceptions to the general warrant requirement include the
following:
(1) searches incident to arrest;
(2) consent;
253. Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 663–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
254. Id. at 659–60.
255. Id. at 660.
256. Id. at 663 (citing Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)) (stating
the “reasonable suspicion” framework necessary to justify an investigatory detention).
257. Id. at 664.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 663–664.
260. See id. at 663.
261. Id. at 665 (Keasler, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 663–64 (majority opinion).
263. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338
(2009).
264. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338.
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(3) inventory searches; and
(4) the existence of exigent circumstances. 265
The Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have addressed at
least two of these exceptions in recent years.
1. Exigent Circumstances
“One well-recognized exception” to the warrant requirement “applies when
the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” 266 A number of situations may present an exigency that justifies
an officer’s warrantless search, including:
(1) the need to provide emergency assistance to an individual; 267
(2) engage in pursuit of a suspect; 268 or
(3) to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. 269
In deciding whether an exigency exists to justify a warrantless search, a reviewing
court looks to the totality of the circumstances, instead of applying any brightline rule. 270
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Supreme Court addressed whether an officer can
use the exigency exception to justify a nonconsensual blood test after a drunkdriving arrest, on the basis that if the blood test was not immediately performed,
evidence would be “destroyed” through the natural metabolization of alcohol in
the arrestee’s bloodstream. 271 The Court ultimately concluded that the exigentcircumstances exception could not justify such a significant intrusion into the
arrestee’s body solely on the basis that natural bodily processes would in time
dissipate potential evidence of the arrestee’s guilt. 272
The Court identified Schmerber v. California 273 as the touchstone for deciding
the issues in McNeely. 274 In that case, the Court had permitted the exigentcircumstances exception to justify a warrantless blood test because the arrestee
had suffered injuries in an automobile accident and had to be taken to the
hospital, which extended the delay necessary to appear before a magistrate to
obtain a proper search warrant. 275 The decision in Schmerber, the Court
explained, was based on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances, which
pointed towards a real exigency justifying a warrantless search. 276 In this case,
however, looking at the totality of the circumstances, there was no evidence that
265. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 n.19 (citing Supreme Court cases in which the Court first
recognized exceptions to the general warrant requirement).
266. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2009).
268. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976).
269. E.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40–41
(1963) (plurality opinion).
270. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006).
271. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013).
272. Id. at 1567–68.
273. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
274. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558–63.
275. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 770.
276. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1560.
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the arresting officer “faced an emergency or unusual delay in securing a
warrant.” 277 Therefore, the warrantless search was not reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 278
The McNeely decision is significant because it categorically rejected the
proposition that an officer is per se permitted to conduct a warrantless blood test
on a drunk-driving arrestee based on exigent circumstances. 279 Instead, officers
will have to be able to identify some other factor contributing to an exigency,
such as the unavailability of a magistrate to issue a warrant, or an emergency
situation such as the one in Schmerber. 280 Additionally, in Texas, the McNeely
case has raised another issue—whether the Texas implied consent statute, which
authorizes police to obtain a blood or breath sample from an individual without
a warrant and regardless of consent under particular circumstances, has been
rendered unconstitutional by the Court’s decision. 281 Defendants have argued
that McNeely has rendered mandatory blood draws categorically
unconstitutional. 282 Texas courts of appeals have not accepted this argument,
reasoning instead that McNeely dealt only with situations where a warrantless
blood or breath specimen was justified by resort to exigent circumstances
alone. 283 It is likely that the Court of Criminal Appeals will deal with the
question of the constitutionality of Texas’ implied consent statute in the near
future.
In Turrubiate v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again addressed
whether a single factor can by itself justify a warrantless search based on exigent
circumstances. 284 Here, when a policeman knocked on the door of a home,
Marcos Turrubiate cracked the door open, and the officer noticed a strong odor
of marijuana coming from inside. 285 Believing that the drugs would be destroyed
if he left to obtain a warrant, the officer forcibly entered the home and
ultimately arrested Turrubiate for drug possession. 286 On appeal, Turrubiate
argued that the exigent-circumstances exception could not justify the officer’s
entry into his home because the officer’s search had been based on only two
factors: the officer’s belief that Turrubiate possessed marijuana, and Turrubiate’s
awareness of the officer’s presence at his home. 287
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. 288 First, the Court identified five
factors that had traditionally been applied by officers in determining whether
277. Id. at 1567–68.
278. Id. at 1568.
279. See id. at 1561–62.
280. See id.
281. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012 (West 2012) (indicating that, for example, a
warrantless blood or breath sample may be taken without consent when an officer has good reason
to believe that an arrestee has two prior DWI convictions).
282. See Douds v. State, No. 14-12-00642-CR, 2013 WL 5629818, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Oct. 15, 2013, no pet. h.).
283. Id. at *5; see also Smith v. State, No. 13-11-00694-CR, 2013 WL 5970400, at *3–4 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 31, 2013, no pet. h.).
284. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 150.
288. Id. at 156.

2014]

Criminal Procedure

125

evidence might be destroyed or removed before they could obtain a search
warrant. 289 However, the Court analyzed these factors in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kentucky v. King,290 and concluded that
these factors “no longer adequately assist a court in determining whether the
record shows an exigent circumstance.” 291 The Supreme Court in King had
directed courts to instead make an assessment of the record in determining
whether the officer conducting the warrantless search “reasonably believed that
the removal or destruction of evidence was imminent,” and the factors in the
older test had gone beyond that simple analysis. 292
In this case, following the test from King, the circumstances did not indicate
that destruction of evidence by Turrubiate was imminent. 293 Although the
officer had smelled marijuana in Turrubiate’s home, and Turrubiate had as a
result known that the officer was “on his tail,” there was no proof of attempted
or actual destruction of evidence. 294 Lacking that evidence, an exigency based on
the imminent destruction was invalid—the Court required proof “beyond mere
knowledge of police presence and an odor of illegal narcotics.” 295 This ruling is
significant because the Court has precluded the possibility of a per se rule
allowing warrantless searches of homes based solely on the odor of narcotics
emanating therefrom. 296
2. Consent to Search
Another exception to the general warrant requirement is consent. A
warrantless search is considered reasonable if law enforcement obtains the
voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority over the space that is
searched. 297 Consent frequently arises in the context of searches of homes and
automobiles. For homes, a person possessing authority might be the owner of
the home, or an individual living in the home who shares common authority
over property within. 298
In State v. Copeland, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed consent
to search in the context of automobiles. 299 The question before the court was
whether a passenger may disallow police to search a vehicle in a situation where
the driver has already provided that consent. 300 Police had pulled over a vehicle
driven by Wayne Danish, who provided consent to search the car. 301 However,
289. Id. at 151 (citing McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
290. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
291. Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 153.
292. Id. (citing King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862).
293. Id. at 153–54.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 154; see also id. at 154 n.5 (citing to several cases listing circumstances under which
an exigency based on the imminent destruction of evidence had in fact been justified).
296. See id. at 151–54.
297. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
181 (1990)).
298. Id. (citing Supreme Court cases establishing rules regarding “authority” sufficient to
uphold voluntary consent to search).
299. State v. Copeland, 399 S.W.3d 159, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 160.
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Shirley Copeland, a passenger in the vehicle, told officers that she was the owner
of the vehicle and that she refused to provide consent. 302 Officers then asked
Danish for the second time if he consented to the search, and he affirmed. 303
Police searched the vehicle over Copeland’s objections, discovered narcotics,
and arrested Copeland. 304
The Court identified that the principles that govern the case are those of
“third-party consent”—situations where consent was not given by the defendant,
but by another who possessed common authority over the space searched. 305 For
homes, third-party consent by a co-tenant is valid when the fellow tenant is
absent when consent is given. 306 Conversely, third-party consent is invalid when
the fellow tenant is present and makes an express refusal of consent. 307
Copeland urged that these principles should be applicable to vehicles, as well,
but the Court rejected this argument. 308 Unlike homes, the Court reasoned,
where there is no generally recognized “hierarchy” of co-tenants, society
recognizes the driver of a vehicle as the individual with a superior right with
respect to the safety and control of a vehicle. 309 Unless circumstances indicate
that a passenger actually retains control over the vehicle and its contents, 310
consent by the driver would be sufficient to justify a warrantless search as
reasonable. 311
While the Court of Criminal Appeals did not ultimately decide the case on
its merits, it seems likely that the consent to search was voluntarily given by
Danish, and Copeland’s objections did not override that consent. 312 According
to a police license plate check, Danish was the registered owner, and Copeland
never provided proof that she was a co-owner or otherwise maintained control
over the vehicle. 313 The Court’s decision indicates that the greater protection for
homes provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in consent cases does not apply to
vehicular consent cases in Texas. 314 If a passenger-defendant wishes to revoke the
driver’s consent, he will have to ensure that the officer knew about the
passenger’s legitimate retention of possessory control over the vehicle.315
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals continues to analyze most
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 162 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).
306. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.
307. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 547 U.S. 103, 122–23 (2006).
308. Copeland, 399 S.W.3d at 164.
309. Id.
310. For instance, the passenger might retain control where a driver is arrested and a passenger
takes control of the vehicle or where an officer learns that a passenger owns the vehicle.
311. Id. at 164, 167.
312. See id. at 160, 167.
313. State v. Copeland, No. 13-11-00701-CR, 2013 WL 6588031, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi, Dec. 12, 2013, no pet. h.).
314. See Copeland, 399 S.W.3d at 164.
315. See id. at 160, 166.
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issues under the United States Constitution, the cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court during this Survey period will have significant impact upon
Texas law. The resurgent property-based model of searches in particular, as set
forth by the Supreme Court in the Jones and Jardines cases, represents a sea
change in the most basic aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court of Criminal Appeals cases decided during the survey period present few
major changes to established precedent, but they do serve to expand or elaborate
upon existing law in the areas of confessions, searches and seizures.

